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I. INTRODUCTION

Premiere Properties, a small Chicago real estate agency, is holding an
interesting employee sales contest.' The month's top seller gets a Cadillac; the
runner-up gets a set of steak knives; and everyone else gets fired. 2 All the salesmen are on edge, but none more so than Dave. He conspires with colleague
George to get revenge on the firm and get rich in the process. The plan: Steal
Premiere's proprietary leads (informational cards identifying prospective highvolume buyers) and sell them to a competitor.3
Dave keeps a low profile, but all week at the office George boasts that
he has finally found a way to stick it to the company.4 On the eve of the heist,
however, George gets cold feet and abandons the plan. 5 Dave quickly recruits
another co-worker, Shelley, to take George's place. The next day, with Dave
acting as a lookout, Shelley hides in the office and waits for everyone to leave.
He then breaks into the firm's safe and absconds with the leads.6
The next morning, a police detective interviews the Premiere salesmen.7
They say they suspect George because of his very public desire to get even with
the company. But John, the office manager, knows the truth. On his way out of
I

The facts of this introductory hypothetical are drawn from Glengarry Glen Ross, a movie

based on David Mamet's classic play of the same name about disgruntled real estate salesmen.
GLENGARRY GLEN ROSS (New Line Cinema 1992).
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

In the film, Dave, not George, does the workplace boasting. Id.

5
6

George's actual level of involvement was likely not quite this high.
It is not clear from the script how exactly Dave and Shelley divided up their roles.
GLENGARRY GLEN ROSS, supra note 1.
7
Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/6

2

Ginsberg: Always Be Disclosing: The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Div

2008]

ALWAYS BE DISCLOSING

the office the night of the robbery, he saw Shelley sneaking around with burglary tools in-hand. 8 John does not want to get directly involved with the investigation, so rather than speak with the detective, he writes a statement explaining
what he saw and slips it under the precinct door. The detective receives John's
statement but never investigates Shelley. Shortly after he delivers the statement,
John is hit by a bus and killed.
George is arrested. Discovery comes and goes, and the prosecution does
not disclose John's statement. The case goes to trial, and the jury convicts on
the basis of George's workplace braggadocio.
After the verdict, the statement comes to light. The defense team
searches Shelley's desk and finds the burglary tools in a secret compartment. On
direct appeal, George's counsel argues that the prosecution's tactics violated the
federal constitutional discovery doctrine of Brady v. Maryland, which holds that
a new trial is required if the prosecution (1) "suppress[es]" evidence that is (2)
"favorable" to the defendant and (3) "material" to his guilt or punishment. 9 Evidence is "material" to guilt or punishment if there is a "reasonable probability"
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense before trial, the defendant
would have been acquitted or would have received a lighter sentence.' 0
The court agrees that favorable evidence was suppressed but holds that
the statement is not material." The court does find that there was a reasonable
probability that, had the statement been disclosed, George's counsel would have
used it to uncover the admissible physical evidence (the burglary tools) and, in
turn, used that evidence to procure an acquittal. Nevertheless, the court holds
that the statement
is per se immaterial because it would not have been admissi12
ble at trial.
8

Evidently, Dave was a sub-par lookout.

9

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,433 (1996).
It is important to keep in mind that "suppression" in the Brady context does not require a

10

n

malicious intent to conceal. It is a term of art that refers to the prosecution's simple failure to
disclose. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

12 Assume that Illinois (which has no evidence code, but rather operates through common-law
decisions) largely follows the Federal Rules of Evidence when it comes to hearsay. Indeed, this
appears to be the case. HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EvIDENCE §§ 801-804 (7th ed. 2001).
John did not make the statement on the witness stand. Therefore, the statement is hearsay
unless it is exempted by Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d). It is not a prior witness statement under Rule 801(d)(1) because John, now dead, cannot be a trial witness. It is not a statement by a
party-opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) because the statement is John's, not the detective's, and
the detective has not adopted it. No other exemptions are relevant. Therefore, the statement is
hearsay.
The detective can testify, but no recognized hearsay exception lets the defense team introduce the statement through him. It is not a present-sense impression under Rule 803(1) because it
was not made immediately following the robbery. It is not a statement of a then-existing condition under Rule 803(3) because that exception does not cover statements of belief about past
events. It is not a recorded recollection under Rule 803(5) because there is no indication that the
detective ever had any more knowledge of the statement than he does now. It is not a qualifying

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110

Many lower courts purport to find an admissibility requirement in the
Supreme Court's Brady jurisprudence. 3 Despite its popularity with the courts,
this "requirement" has received little in the way of detailed analysis in judicial
opinions and scholarly literature.' 4 The "rule" is frequently invoked but rarely
explored. This Article attempts to reverse that trend.
Part II of the Article introduces the Supreme Court's Brady line of cases
as background. Part Ill analyzes arguments for the existence of an admissibility
requirement and attempts to demonstrate that they simply are not consistent with
the text of and principles behind relevant Supreme Court holdings.
public record under Rule 803(8)(C) because it was not made by the police pursuant to an investigation John submitted it voluntarily. No other exceptions in Rules 803 or 804 are relevant. Therefore, the statement is inadmissible hearsay.
The statement could be introduced not for its truth but simply to show that the police were
on notice of another suspect but failed to investigate. Assume for the purposes of this hypothetical that the statement would not be material if offered for this purpose.
13 See, e.g., Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J.) (holding
inadmissible statements "as a matter of law, 'immaterial' for Brady purposes"); Hill v. Mitchell,
1:98-cv-452, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70528, *189 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2006) (parenthetically
noting that failed polygraph is immaterial because it "would not constitute admissible evidence");
D'Ambrosio v. Bagley, No. 1:00 CV 2521, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12794, *76 (N.D. Ohio March
24, 2006) (holding that "there is no Brady violation where the prosecution withheld evidence that
would have been inadmissible during trial); Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 748 n.2 (E.D.
Mich. 2004) (parenthetically noting that "evidence that is inadmissible under state law is not material for purposes of establishing a Brady violation"); Hernandez-Rios v. United States, No. 97228(PG), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14567, *47 (D.P.R. June 29, 2004) (holding that "evidence... that is not admissible at trial is deemed not material.. .under Brady"); United States v.
Edelin, 128 F. Supp. 2d 23, 41 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that certain evidence at issue "cannot be
categorized as material, in terms of Brady, because the information is inadmissible"); United
States v. Montalvo, 20 F. Supp. 2d 270, 277 (D.P.R. 1998) (holding that "evidence that is not
admissible at trial is deemed not 'material' under Brady"); United States v. Chandler, 950 F.
Supp. 1522, 1536 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding inadmissible evidence immaterial because disclosure
"could not have carried any reasonable probability of changing the result at trial"); United States
v. Gonzalez, 938 F. Supp. 1199, 1207 (D. Del. 1996) (holding that "Before evidence can be
deemed 'material' for Brady purposes, it must be shown that the evidence would have been admissible at trial").
But, some courts have (properly, as this Article argues) rejected an admissibility requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2002); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d
559, 567 (11 th Cir. 2000) (finding no Brady violation but explaining that lack of admissibility is
not a bar).
14
One of the few thorough judicial discussions of a purported admissibility requirement is
given by the Southern District of Indiana in Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 844-46 (S.D.
Ind. 2000) (Hamilton, J.). In the scholarly literature, no more than a handful of articles analyzing
Brady have spent more than a subsection on admissibility. See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics Symposium: Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S.TEx. L. REv. 685, 700-04 (2006).
Only one appears to have focused on that topic, but it concerns itself more with reconciling divergent views of circuit courts than critically examining Supreme Court precedent. Gregory S. Seador, Note, A Search for Truth or a Game of Strategy? The Circuit Split over the Prosecution's
Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible Exculpatory Information to the Accused, 51 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 139 (2001).
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Part IV examines precisely how an admissibility requirement disallows
certain compelling Brady claims, thereby facilitating a malicious prosecutorial
strategy, and works in conjunction with Supreme Court certiorari practices to
foreclose avenues of federal appellate review of Brady decisions. Part V attempts to demonstrate that economic arguments denying the feasibility and costeffectiveness of operating without an admissibility requirement are premature
and perhaps incorrect.
Part VI considers a regime containing an admissibility requirement and
discusses the consequences of whether the requirement is found to be constitutionally compelled or merely prudential. The Article concludes by recommending a solution that captures the chief benefits of an admissibility requirement
while eliminating certain of its undesirable effects.

II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S BRADY JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Materiality Generally

In the seminal case, defendant Brady conspired with Boblit to rob
Brooks and steal his car.1 5 Brady and Boblit waited outside Brooks's house one
day and prepared to ambush him on his way home from work. 16 Brooks pulled
into the driveway, got out of his car, and was promptly knocked unconscious
with a blow to the head.' 7 The pair then stole Brooks's wallet and used Brooks's
car to transport him to a distant wooded area.' 8 Once there, one of the men
strangled Brooks to death with a shirt. 19 Each man's participation constituted
felony-murder, but it was possible that the person who did not strangle Brooks
would be spared the death penalty.2 °
Police arrested Brady and Boblit.21 Brady made several statements, and
in each one he confessed to being present at the scene of the crime but denied
strangling Brooks.22 Boblit also gave several statements to the police, and in one
of them he admitted to being the strangler.2 3 Brady was tried first. 24 Before trial
in Maryland state court, Brady's lawyer moved for discovery of all of Boblit's
15

Brady v. State, 157 A.2d 434, 434 (Md. Ct. App. 1959) (codefendants' consolidated direct
appeal).
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Brady, 373 U.S. at 85.
Brady v. State, 160 A.2d 912, 913 (Md. Ct. App. 1960) (denying state-law new-trial mo-

21
tion).
22

Id.

23

373 U.S. at 84.
Id.

24
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statements, but the government withheld the statement wherein Boblit admitted
he was the killer.2 5
At trial, Brady testified that he was present when Brooks was killed but
that he did not strangle him. 26 Brady did not call Boblit as a witness, nor did he
call the police to ask them about their investigation.27 Brady was convicted and
sentenced to death.28 The jury's verdict was affirmed on direct appeal.2 9
After Brady's conviction became final, his counsel got word of the exculpatory statement and moved for a new trial on the basis of this newly discovered evidence. 30 The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals
(Maryland's highest court) affirmed. 3' Brady then filed for state post-conviction
relief. 32 The trial court denied relief, but the Maryland Court of Appeals granted
a new trial on the issue of punishment only.33 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
affirmed, fashioning a due process-based discovery doctrine: "[T]he suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt ''or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
In Giglio v. United States, Giglio conspired with a bank teller to cash
phony money orders purportedly endorsed by other bank customers. 35 The teller
provided Giglio with copies of their signatures.3 6 Giglio then redeemed the
money by submitting the bogus orders back to the teller to enter them into the
eyewitness linking Giglio to the
bank's system.37 The teller, who was the only
38
crime, confessed this conspiracy to the FBI.
Giglio was arrested, but the teller avoided prosecution by agreeing to
testify for the government in exchange for immunity. 39 Before trial, Giglio's
attorney moved to discover all deals made with government witnesses. 4u The
25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 170-71 (Md. Ct. App. 1961) (reversing denial of state post-

conviction relief).
28

373 U.S. at 84.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id. at 84-85.

33

Id. at 85.

34

Id. at 87.

35
36

405 U.S. 150, 150 (1972).
Id. at 151.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 152.

40

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/6
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prosecution did not disclose the agreement with the teller. 41 The government's
case depended almost entirely upon the teller, so Giglio tried vigorously to discredit him. 42 On cross-examination, the teller represented that he never entered
into any immunity agreement, and the prosecutor echoed this in his closing
ar44
gument. 43 The government's strategy prevailed; Giglio was convicted.
While the direct appeal was pending, the immunity agreement came to
light.4 5 Giglio moved for a new trial on the basis of the agreement, and his motion was denied by the district court and this denial affirmed by the Second Circuit.46 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence impeaching a prosecution witness can form the basis of a Brady claim "when the reliability of [that]
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence., 4 7 The Court went on
to explain that such evidence is material if it "in any reasonable likelihood"
could have affected the judgment of the jury.48 Thus, Giglio extended Brady to
cover impeachment evidence, at least with respect to the guilt phase. It also offered the Court's first elaboration of the materiality standard.
That standard was complicated by the next principal case, United States
v. Agurs.4 9 Agurs, a prostitute, checked into a hotel with Sewell, her client.5 °
Sewell left the room to use the bathroom and, upon returning, found Agurs rifling through his clothes.5' When Sewell attempted to stop her, she stabbed him
with a hunting knife he had put with his clothes before he left the room. 52 At
trial on charges of second-degree murder, Agurs asserted self-defense based on
the fact that Sewell carried a large hunting knife and therefore was a violent
person.53 The prosecution countered with an autopsy report demonstrating that
Sewell had been stabbed repeatedly in the chest, arms, and hands, and that some
of these wounds indicated that Sewell was not the aggressor. 54 Further, the prosecution showed that Agurs55 had no cuts or bruises at the time of her arrest the
morning after the incident.
41

Id.

42

Id. at 151-52, 154-55.

43

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

4

45
46

151-52.
150.

150-51.
153, 155.

51

Id. at 154.
Id.
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Id. at 99.
Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.
Id. at 102.

47
48

49
50

55
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Agurs was convicted.56 While direct appeal was pending, Agurs's attorney discovered that Sewell had a criminal record, containing convictions for
several violent crimes, which would bolster Agurs's claim of self-defense.57 The
district court denied a motion for a new trial, but the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.5 8 The Supreme Court reversed the appellate59decision, and in so
doing established a tripartite classification of Brady claims.
In the first category were cases where the undisclosed evidence indicated that the prosecution at least negligently used perjured testimony. 6° In such
a case, a new trial must be ordered "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. ' 61 In the second
category were cases where the prosecution did not at least negligently use perjured testimony, but where the defense made a specific request for a particular
piece of evidence.6 2 The Court did not specify the corresponding materiality
standard, but held that "the failure to make any response [to such request] is
seldom, if ever, excusable. 63 In the third category were cases where the prosecution did not at least negligently use perjured testimony, but where the defense
did not make a specific request. 64 The Court held that undisclosed evidence is
material in such a situation if it "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist" in light of the entire record.65
The facts of Agurs fit into the third category. 66 The Court held that Sewell's criminal record was immaterial under this standard due to the strength of
the government's inculpatory physical evidence and the fact that the undisclosed
evidence would merely offer a different route to prove a fact Agurs had already
proved by other means. 67 The Court also emphasized that materiality in this
context deals with the presentation of the defendant's case rather than the defendant's ability to prepare for trial.68

56

Id. at 100.

57
58

Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101-02.

59
60

Id. at 103.
Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 104.

63

Id. at 106.

64

Id. at 107.
Id. at 112.

65

66
67

Id. at 107.
Id. at 113-14.

68

Id. at 113 n.20.
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This tripartite framework was undone in United States v. Bagley, a fednarcotics
prosecution. 69 Bagley was arrested for unlawful possession and
eral
delivery of a controlled substance. 70 Before his bench trial, Bagley moved to
discover any deals made with government witnesses. 71 The prosecution turned
over nothing of the sort.72
At trial, two undercover agents served as the government's "principal
witnesses. 7 3 Having posed as Bagley's coworkers at the Milwaukee Railroad,
they testified that on multiple occasions they visited Bagley's home in a social
capacity and he provided them with valium. 74 They recorded these meetings
with concealed transmitters, but the quality of the recordings was too poor for
the tapes to be used at trial.75 Bagley took the stand and admitted the deliveries,
but he argued that they did not violate the federal statute at issue, partly because
he had a lawful valium prescription.76 Bagley's testimony proved unsuccessful;
he was found guilty on the narcotics charges.77
Several years after trial, a Freedom of Information Act request turned up
compensation agreements between the government and the two undercover
agents.78 Bagley filed a motion for a new trial on the theory that, had he known
about the deals, he would have denied the deliveries (contrary to his actual trial
strategy) and attempted to impeach the agents. 79 The district court denied the
motion, but was reversed on appeal.80
A majority of the Supreme Court (via two separate opinions) took the
opportunity to reformulate the materiality standard, holding that (at least outside
the negligent-perjury context) it does not vary with the specificity of the request. 81 In particular, evidence is material "only if there is a reasonable probabil-

ity that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different., 82 Justices Blackmun and O'Connor ex473 U.S. 667 (1985). Bagley was also prosecuted on firearms charges, but discussion of
that portion of the case is not relevant for the purposes of this background chronology of the development of the materiality standard.
70
Id. at 685-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69

71
72

73
74
75

Id. at 669-70.
Id. at 670.
Id.
Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

76

Id.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (No. 84-48).

77

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 671.

78

Id.

79

Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (No. 84-48).
473 U.S. at 673.
Id. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ.); id. at 685 (opinion of White, J., Burger,

80
s

C.J. & Rehnquist, J. concurring).
82
Id. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ.).
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plained that "a 'reasonable probability' [is] a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." 83 The Court reversed Bagley's conviction and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to apply this new standard.84
The Bagley materiality standard was endorsed (with a slight twist) in
Kyles v. Whitley.85 There, Kyles was arrested on charges that he shot and killed
a woman, Dye, in a Schwegmann's grocery store parking lot while Dye was
loading groceries into her car.86 Before trial, Kyles's attorney made a request 87for
discovery of all exculpatory evidence, and the government disclosed nothing.
At trial in Louisiana state court, the prosecution relied principally on
four eyewitnesses who testified that they saw a black man fitting Kyles's description struggle with a woman matching Dye's description, shoot her, and then
drive off in her Ford LTD.88 Thanks to Beanie, an acquaintance of Kyles's who
acted as an informant, the prosecution also offered a Schwegmann's receipt, a
woman's purse, and a gun identified as the murder weapon that was found in
Kyles's home. 89 Kyles defended by claiming that the eyewitnesses were mistaken and that Beanie was framing him.90 The jury hung, but Kyles was found
guilty in his second trial, where the prosecution and defense both advanced
theories substantially similar to those used in the first.91
During state collateral proceedings, Kyles's attorney learned that the
prosecution failed to disclose prior inconsistent statements of two of the eyewitnesses, as well as a police inventory of the Schwsegmann's lot conducted immediately after the shooting which revealed that Kyles's car-which the prosecution claimed he left there before speeding off in Dye's LTD-was not parked
there.92 Also, the prosecution suppressed several mutually inconsistent statements made by Beanie that, taken together, tended to cast Beanie in a very suspicious light. The statements also supported Kyles's claim that he was framed
and suggested that the police investigation was less than meticulous.9 3
The district court denied habeas and was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit,
but the Supreme Court reversed. 94 The Kyles Court quoted the Bagley materiality standard, but truncated the Bagley Court's opinion by holding that evidence
is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been dis83
94

85
86
87

88
89

Id.
Id. at 684.
514 U.S. 419 (1995).
Id. at 423, 427.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 427, 429.
Id. at 428.

92

Id. at 429.
Id. at 429-31.
Id. at 428-29, 431.

93

Id. at 428-29.

94

Id. at 431,454.

90
91
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closed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different," in
'95 The Kyles
contrast to the Bagley formulation which used the phrase "only if."
Court then adopted the Bagley opinion filed by Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor by holding that a reasonable probability exists if the evidence "could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.",96 Further, the Court clarified that
while a "reasonable probability" means a probability higher than mere chance, it
does not mean a probability greater than 50 percent.97
The Court explained that the suppressed evidence was material because,
had the evidence been disclosed, Kyles could have refuted the prosecution's
theory that he left his car in the parking lot.98 Also, Kyles could have called
Beanie as an adverse witness and probed the inconsistency of his several statements, tending to show that the circumstances surrounding Beanie's tips were
not on-the-level. 99 Additionally, Kyles could have used Beanie's statement to
examine police officers assigned to the case in order to demonstrate the haphazard nature of the investigation.'°°
The Kyles standard ("if' rather than "only if") was reaffirmed in the
Court's three most recent materiality cases. In Strickler v. Greene, the Court
used the Kyles standard to deny a Brady claim based on suppressed evidence
impeaching an eyewitness to an abduction when there was a large amount of
uncontested physical evidence also linking the habeas petitioner to the crime.101
In Banks v. Dretke, the Court used the Kyles standard to grant habeas relief on
the basis of an undisclosed deal with a key prosecution witness in a case light on
physical evidence. 10 2 Finally, in Youngblood v. West Virginia, the Court reversed a denial of a motion for a new trial where the lower court failed to realize
and remanded to that court to evaluate materithat the motion implicated Brady,
10 3
ality using the Kyles standard.
B.

Admissibility in Particular

Wood v. Bartholomew is the only time the Supreme Court expressly addressed the role of admissibility in the materiality inquiry.104 In that case, which
came on the heels of Kyles, Dwayne Bartholomew shot and killed a Laundromat
95
96

Id. at 433 (emphasis added); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.

97

Id. at 434-37.

98

Id. at 450-51.

99

Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 446-48.
527 U.S. 263 (1999).
540 U.S. 668 (2004).
126 S.Ct. 2188 (2006).

100

101
102
103

104 516 U.S. 1 (1995).
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attendant. 10 5 If the prosecution could prove premeditation, it could convict
Dwayne 06of aggravated first-degree murder rather than ordinary first-degree
murder.
At trial in Washington state court, the prosecution called Dwayne's
brother, Rodney, and Rodney's girlfriend, Tracy, as witnesses.' °7 Rodney and
Tracy each testified that Dwayne told them he was going to rob the store and
leave no witnesses. 0 8 Furthermore, they each testified that they were not present
with Dwayne in the Laundromat and did not assist Dwayne with the crime.10 9
Dwayne argued at trial that his gun went off accidentally while he was
taking money out of the cash register." 0 He attempted to discredit Rodney and
Tracy by arguing that they lied about the extent of Rodney's participation in the
crime."' In particular, Dwayne tried to show that Rodney was the one who convinced the night manager to let them into the store in the first place. 12 The
ar3
gument failed; Dwayne was convicted of aggravated first-degree murder.'
After Dwayne's conviction became final, his counsel learned of the results of polygraph examinations given to Tracy and Rodney before trial. 1 4 The
results tended to show that Rodney had indeed participated in the crime, and
therefore that his testimony was false." 5 However, the polygraph evidence was
inadmissible under Washington law. 116 The district court denied habeas relief,
but the Ninth Circuit reversed." 7 Without briefing or oral argument," 8 the Supreme Court, in a Per Curiam opinion with four dissenters, used the Kyles standard (with a slight but potentially important variation analyzed in Part lIH.C below) to hold that the polygraph evidence was immaterial. 19
In its discussion of materiality, the Court made several curious points.
First, it stated that, because the polygraph results were inadmissible, they were
"not 'evidence' at all."' 20 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the results could have

106

Id.at 2.
Id.at 3.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.

1o5

11o Id.
"'l

Id.at4.

112

Id. at 3-4.

13
114

115
116
117

Id.at 4.
Id.at 4-5.

Id.at4.
Id. at 5.
Id.

E-mail from Timothy K. Ford, habeas counsel for petitioner Dwayne Bartholomew, to Brian
D. Ginsberg (Oct. 19, 2006, 16:53:00 EST) (on file with author).
119
516 U.S. at 5, 8.
120 Id.at 6.
118
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had no "direct" effect on the trial outcome.' 2' It also noted that the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the results could have led the defense to depose Rodney
(who was not in fact deposed before trial), which in turn would have led Rodney
to confess the extent of his participation, was "judgment based on mere
' 22 speculaestablished."'
have
we
standards
[materiality]
the
of
violation
in
tion,
This chronology of the Brady materiality standard provides the background necessary to identify and assess arguments for the proposition that the
Court's decisions require admissibility.
III. DERIVING AN ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENT FROM SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT

Lower courts have often held that the materiality prong of the Brady inquiry restricts Brady claims to "admissible" evidence. 23 This Part collects arguments (not all of which have actually been used by courts or litigants) in favor
of that proposition and attempts to demonstrate that none of them stands up to
scrutiny.
But before analyzing the actual arguments, it is necessary to determine
exactly what "admissible" means in this context. The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is not obvious. In answering this question, it will be useful to differentiate
between inadmissible evidence that would otherwise (but for its inadmissibility)
be material, on the one hand, and evidence that would not be material regardless
of admissibility, on the other. Call the former evidence "material-in-fact" inadmissible evidence. Therefore, if an admissibility requirement does exist, evidence must be both (1) material-in-fact and (2) admissible in order to be "material" for Brady purposes.
A.

If an Admissibility RequirementDoes Exist, What Does It Entail?
1.

Backward-Looking vs. Forward-Looking

The Brady discovery doctrine is troublesome in application partly because it requires a prosecutor, before trial, to assess the expected impact of pieces of evidence in the context of the defense's entire case, which is necessarily
unknowable until after trial.' 24 This ex ante/ex post asymmetry complicates the
idea of "admissibility" for Brady purposes. It makes answering the question,

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

See supra note 13.
Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search

124

for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 146 (Carol Steiker, ed. 2005); DEFENDING
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: ATTACKING THE GOVERNMENT'S PROOF

§ 5.06[4] (Diana D. Parker,

ed. 2006).
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"What does it mean to say that evidence 'would have been admissible at trial'?"
nontrivial.
It could be that a piece of evidence is "admissible" only if it would have
been admitted at some point during the course of the actual trial as the trial unfolded. Call this "backward-looking" admissibility, since under such a definition, evidence is "admissible" for Brady purposes only if it could have been
cleanly inserted into the original proceedings as they actually occurred. If, for
example, a new witness or theory of the case would have been required to make
the evidence admissible, then such evidence is not "admissible."
Alternatively, it could be that a piece of evidence is "admissible" if,
supposing that the defense had the evidence before trial, the defense could have
crafted some strategy and witness lineup under which the evidence would have
been admitted. Call this "forward-looking" admissibility, because it measures
admissibility from the standpoint of pre-trial preparation rather than post-trial
hindsight. Note that if a piece of evidence is "backward-looking" admissible, it
126
is also "forward-looking" admissible.1 25 The converse is not necessarily true.
Brady itself suggests that the broader definition, "forward-looking" admissibility, is the appropriate one. There, the Maryland Court of Appeals's
opinion (which the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed) held that Boblit's undisclosed
confession was material to the level of Brady's punishment.1 27 But, that court
also held that the confession would not have been admissible in the trial as it
actually unfolded. 28 Brady needed to have called either Boblit (to crossexamine him about the confession) or the investigating officer (to show that the
police investigation negligently relied on inconsistent statements) as witnesses-which Brady did not do-in order to introduce the confession. 29 That
is, the Brady Court deemed "material" evidence that was not backward-looking
admissible. Thus, if admissibility is required, it is admissibility in the more
30
expansive "forward-looking" sense.
The Court's approach to materiality in general strengthens this conclusion. Ever since Bagley, the Court has (with one exception analyzed later in this
Article) said that the requisite "reasonable probability" of an acquittal or senTo see this, suppose that the evidence could have been neatly inserted into the trial proceedings as they actually unfolded. Then the hypothetical course of trial called for by forward-looking
admissibility is simply the actual course of trial.
126
Even if the defense could have crafted some trial strategy under which the evidence would
have been admitted, the evidence might not have been neatly insertible using the trial strategy
actually employed.
125

127

Brady, 174 A.2d at 171.

Id. at 170-71.
Id.
130
Bagley bolsters this conclusion, because the Supreme Court there acknowledged (by remanding to the Ninth Circuit rather than finding no Brady violation) that evidence that would
have caused the petitioner to revise his entire theory of the case may be material (and therefore
admissible, if one assumes that materiality requires admissibility). See supra Part I.
128

129
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tence reduction is measured at the time the evidence is disclosed "to the defense," rather than "to the jury" or "to the factfinder.'' 3 Even in the one outlier
case, the Court never affirmatively indicates that the relevant disclosure is disclosure to anyone other than the defense team. 132 That is, a court determines
materiality of the evidence based on what the defense would have done with it
(a forward-looking inquiry) rather than simply how the jury would have appraised it had it been inserted neatly into the trial proceedings (a backwardlooking inquiry). It would be strange, then, to use a backward-looking approach
to evaluate admissibility, because the materiality inquiry as a whole is expressed
in decidedly forward-looking language.
2.

Admissible for What Purpose?

A piece of evidence may be admissible for one use and inadmissible for
another. However, it is possible that only one use makes the evidence materialin-fact. For example, John's statement implicating Shelley is inadmissible hearsay when offered for its truth. 133 But, that same statement is arguably admissible
when used not for its truth but proving that the police were on notice of a suspect other than George yet negligently failed to investigate.
This prompts the question whether, to be considered "admissible" for
Brady purposes, evidence must be admissible (using the forward-looking definition) for the particular use for which it is material-in-fact. Suppose that John's
statement is not material-in-fact if offered to prove police negligence. In the
context of the introductory hypothetical, then, the question becomes whether, to
be considered "admissible" for Brady purposes, the statement must be admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. It should be noted that this inquiry
is independent of the forward-looking/backward-looking distinction made immediately above.
The Supreme Court opinions offer little guidance on this point, because
in all relevant cases the evidence was either (a) admissible for the use for which
the evidence was material-in-fact, 134 (b) inadmissible for any use, 135 or (c) immaterial-in-fact for any use. 136 Raising this question as sharply as possible requires evidence that is admissible for a use other than that for which it is material-in-fact.
131 Youngblood, 126 S. Ct. at 2190; Banks 540 U.S. at 703; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280; Kyles,
514 U.S. at 433; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (1985) (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ.); Id. at 685 (Burger,
C.J., White & Rehnquist, JJ.).
132
Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 5 (simply mentioning "disclosure" rather than disclosure to any
particular person or entity).
133 See supra Part I, note 12 and accompanying text.
134 See Banks, 540 U.S. at 668; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 419; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 667; Giglio, 405
U.S. at 150.
135 See Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 1.
136 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 97; Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 1; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 263.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110

To allow a claim where the evidence at issue is admissible only for a
use other than the use for which it is material-in-fact, however, seems to betray
the requirement's underlying rationale. The basic idea of an admissibility requirement breaks down if no nexus is demanded between the purpose for which
the evidence is admissible and the purpose for which it is material-in-fact.
It is not necessary, for the arguments that follow, to press this issue further. It suffices to assume that, if an admissibility requirement exists, it mandates admissibility for the use that makes the evidence material-in-fact.
Summing up, if an admissibility requirement exists, the materiality
prong of the Brady test must take substantially the following form: Evidence is
material if (1) it is material-in-fact when used for some purpose, and (2) the defense could have created some strategy and assembled some witness list making
the evidence admissible for that purpose.
B.

Has the Court Adopted an Admissibility Requirement?

The remainder of this section evaluates arguments that could be made
(though only some of them actually have been made) for the proposition that
Supreme Court precedent dictates an admissibility requirement. The goal of the
remainder of this section is to demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent contemplates that inadmissible evidence may form the basis for a Brady claim.
1.

Brady: The Maryland Court of Appeals's "Ruling on the Admissibility" of Boblit's Confession

The Brady Court ruled that Boblit's undisclosed confession was immaterial to guilt, noting that the Maryland Court of Appeals held that "[i]f Boblit's
withheld confession had been before the jury, nothing in it could have reduced
the appellant Brady's offense below murder in the first degree."'137 The Court
then offered its interpretation of that passage: "We read that statement as a ruling on the admissibility of the confession on the issue of innocence or guilt,"
38 A
meaning that Boblit's confession was inadmissible with respect to guilt. 39
1
materiality.
of
lack
a
lack of admissibility, the argument concludes, implies
That the Maryland Court of Appeals's statement was indeed a ruling on
admissibility is far from clear. And even if the statement was a ruling on admissibility, the implications of that ruling hinge upon the particular basis for finding
the confession inadmissible.
It is perfectly plausible that the statement was a ruling on evidentiary
weight rather than admissibility. The Court noted that, at trial, Brady admitted
participating in the murder. Further, in his closing argument, "Brady's counsel
137
138
139

Brady, 174 A.2d at 171.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 90.
For an example of a court using this argument, see United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d

1321, 1333 n.10 (7th Cir. 1979) (dictum).
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conceded that Brady was guilty of murder in the first degree" because of his
participation in the crime.140 Thus, as the opening paragraphs of the Court's own
opinion indicate, the confession would not have done Brady any good on guilt
simply because it-like all the other evidence in the case-indicated that Brady
was present at the crime scene and therefore sufficed to prove Brady guilty of
felony-murder.14 1 "Nothing in [the confession]" helped Brady on the guilt issue,
then, because the confession, though admissible, did not weigh heavily in favor
of his innocence.
But suppose for the sake of argument that the Maryland Court of Appeals's statement was a ruling on admissibility. Does it necessarily follow that
Brady established an admissibility requirement? Answering this question requires examining why the Maryland Court of Appeals held the confession inadmissible on guilt.
All indications given by the Maryland Court of Appeals and the U.S.
Supreme Court indicate that the basis for finding the confession inadmissible on
guilt must have been relevance. 42 The undisclosed confession was not relevant
to proving Brady's innocence because the confession, although it cast doubt on
Brady's being the strangler and therefore upon the propriety of a death sentence
versus life imprisonment, implicated Brady in enough conduct to warrant a firstdegree murder conviction. 43 Indeed, the government in its brief to the Supreme
Court conceded that the confession was irrelevant to Brady's guilt. The government argued that Boblit's suppressed confession is "solely relevant.. .to the
question of punishment,"' 44 and later reiterated that "punishment..
. is the only
145
issue to which the withheld statement was relevant."'
After this analysis, it would be disingenuous to say that Brady's confession was immaterial to guilt because it was inadmissible. Rather, the confession was immaterial to guilt because it was irrelevantto proving Brady's innocence. That such irrelevance meant the confession was also inadmissible is a
collateral consequence generated by state evidence law.

140
141

373 U.S. at 84.
Id.at 83.

Brady, 174 A.2d at 168-69 ("On this appeal, Brady concedes that '[alt his trial the appellant
[Brady] admitted participation in the robbery in the course of which the homicide occurred."'); Id.
at 169 ("As we held on the original appeals of Boblit and Brady, the killing was clearly ...murder in the first degree."); Brady, 373 U.S. at 84 ("At his trial, Brady took the stand and admitted
his participation in the crime .....
143
Brady, 373 U.S. at 85.
144 Brief of Respondent at 8, Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (Doc. No. 490) (emphasis added).
145 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
142
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Kyles: Comparison with American Bar Association Disclosure
Guidelines

The Kyles Court, in its exegesis on the materiality standard, explained
that "the rule in Bagley (and, hence, in Brady) requires less of the prosecution
than the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, which call
generally for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate or
mitigate." 146 In a parenthetical reference, the Court then quoted the relevant
ABA Standard in effect at the time:
A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the
existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate
the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged
or which
47
would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.
For the phrase "evidence or information" not to be redundant, the argument proceeds, "evidence" must refer only to admissible evidence, and inadmissible evidence must be included in "information." Because Brady requires less
disclosure than the ABA Standard, the argument concludes, Brady must not
require the disclosure of inadmissible evidence (mere "information"). 148
This conclusion is plausible, but it is not inevitable and likely not what
the Court had in mind. Brady may be weaker than the ABA Standard because it
requires the disclosure only of admissible evidence, as the argument asserts.
But, it may also be weaker for the independent reason that it requires disclosure
only of evidence that is material-in-fact, and not evidence which merely "tends"
to negate guilt or punishment-evidence which the ABA Standard encompasses. 149 The strength of the two discovery rules can be compared and contrasted on two dimensions, not just one, and Brady may be considered weaker
because it is weaker on the second dimension.
Other language in the Court's opinion confirms that it indeed focused
on the second rationale. The Court lays a foundation for contrasting Brady with
the ABA Standard by stating first that "the Constitution is not violated every
time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove
helpful to the defense."'' 50 It then explains that, unlike Brady, the ABA Standard
does not have a very demanding weight-of-evidence threshold that must be met
146
147

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
Id. (quoting ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.11 (a) (3d ed. 1993)). This stan-

dard is substantially similar to current standard 11-2.1 (a)(viii).
148 A LEXIS search did not uncover any court decisions (reported or unreported) invoking this
argument.
149

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.

150

Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
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before triggering mandatory disclosure. The ABA Standard, the Court explains,
calls for disclosure of evidence "tending to exculpate or mitigate. '' 5 ,
The Court thus appears to differentiate Brady and the ABA Standard
based not upon the type of evidence encompassed by each (according to the
argument introduced at the beginning of this section, admissible versus inadmissible), but rather upon the weight-of-evidence threshold that must be reached
under each test before disclosure is required (the demanding reasonableprobability standard versus the tendency-to-mitigate standard). One can, without even considering the dimension of admissibility, say that Brady requires less
disclosure than the ABA Standard because "materiality" is a more demanding
trigger than mere "tendency." The Kyles Court's comparison of Brady with the
ABA Standard, then, does not necessarily indicate that Brady encompasses only
admissible evidence.
3.

The Bartholomew Arguments

Lower courts have found in the Bartholomew opinion a fountainhead of
rationales 52to cite for the proposition that inadmissible evidence can never be
material.1
a.

"'Not 'Evidence at All"

In enumerating the elements of a constitutional discovery violation,
Brady and its progeny all speak of material "evidence."' 53 Therefore, the argument asserts, since inadmissible 55evidence is "not 'evidence' at all,"' 5 4 it cannot
form the basis of a Brady claim.1
The Court cites no authority for the proposition that "inadmissible evidence" is a contradiction in terms. 156 This semantic argument is further undercut
by the fact that both before and after Bartholomew, the Supreme Court has decoupled the question "What is evidence?" from the question "What is admissi151 Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
152

See supra note 13.

153 Bagley, 473 U.S.at 682 (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ.); Id. at 685 (Burger, C.J., White &
Rehnquist, JJ.); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-04, 107; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
All cases since Bartholomew have also referred to "evidence" as the raw material of Brady claims.
Youngblood, 126 S. Ct. at 2190; Banks, 540 U.S. at 668 ; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280; Kyles, 514
U.S. at 433.
It should be noted, however, that the Strickler Court does refer to "suppressed information"
(rather than "evidence") once in the opinion. 540 U.S. at 703 (emphasis added). However, admissibility was not an issue in that case, so it is doubtful that the Court's usage of "information" was
intended to affirmatively approve the use of inadmissible evidence in a Brady claim.
154 Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 6.
155 For an example of a court using this argument, see United States v. Edelin, 128 F. Supp. 2d
23, 41 (D.D.C. 2001).
156 Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 6.
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ble?" in the context of polygraph results-the very type of evidence at issue in
Bartholomew. That is, it has indicated that polygraph results can be "evidence"
yet at the same time be "inadmissible." It has done this by characterizing polygraph results as "inadmissible evidence," "evidence which is not admissible," or
the equivalent, both before and after Bartholomew. For example, in Lankford v.
Idaho, the pre-Bartholomew Court observes that "[polygraph] evidence is inadmissible in Idaho in an ordinary case..."' 5 7 And in United States v. Scheffer, the
post-Bartholomew Court notes that "[u]ntil quite recently, federal and state
courts were uniform in categorically ruling polygraph evidence inadmissible
under the [Frye] test . . .",5 Interestingly, the Scheffer majority included the
same five Justices who constituted the majority in Bartholomew. 59
That the Supreme Court treats the questions "What is evidence?" and
"What is admissible?" separately is also illuminated by examining the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The Court proposed the Federal Rules of Evidence in the
first instance and has the delegated power to propose amendments.' 60 These
amendments take effect unless Congress objects. 161 Many of the original proposed rules refer to concepts such as "inadmissible evidence." For example, the
Court in Proposed Rule 103(c) wrote that jury cases should be conducted "so as
to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury .... ,, Further, in Proposed Rule 402, the Court wrote that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible."'163 And for one more example, the Court in Proposed
Rule 609 wrote that, for impeachment purposes, the pendency of an appeal from
164
a conviction "does not render evidence of [that] conviction inadmissible."'
157

500 U.S. 110, 124 (1991).

158

523 U.S. 303, 312 n.7 (1998).
Id. (emphasis added). See also Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355 (2004) (characteriz-

159

ing habeas petitioner's assertion that juries are better factfinders than courts as based in part on
juries' "protection from exposure to inadmissible evidence") (not concerning polygraph results)
(same five-Justice majority as in Bartholomew).
160
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972) (as first transmitted to Congress
by Supreme Court); 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
161
28 U.S.C. § 2074(a).
162
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 103, 56 F.R.D. 183, 195 (1972) (as first transmitted to Congress by
Supreme Court), enacted by Congress in Pub L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1930 (1975) (relevant
language not disturbed), amended by Supreme Court in 192 F.R.D. 340, 399 (2000) (relevant
language not disturbed).
163
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 402, 56 F.R.D. 183, 216 (1972) (as first transmitted to Congress by
Supreme Court), enacted by Congress in Pub L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1930 (1975) (relevant
language not disturbed).
164
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609, 56 F.R.D. 183, 270 (1972) (as first transmitted to Congress by
Supreme Court), enacted by Congress in Pub L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1935 (1975) (relevant
language not disturbed), amended by Supreme Court in 113 F.R.D. 361, 366-67 (1987) (relevant
language not disturbed), amended by Supreme Court in 129 F.R.D. 347, 350 (1990) (relevant
language not disturbed), amended by Supreme Court in http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/
7/257/2422/14mar20010800/www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frevO6.pdf (2006) (last
visited Dec. 2, 2007) (relevant language not disturbed).
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65 The
Neither the Court nor Congress has ever sought to amend this language.
66
trend.
larger
a
of
examples
just
aforementioned rules are, of course,
Like the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were first proposed by the Supreme Court. 67 The Court may propose
68
amendments, and those amendments take effect unless Congress objects.
Also like the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure countenance the separation of the questions "What is evidence?" and
"What is admissible?" For example, the Court proposed (and Congress never
rejected) an amendment to Rule 12. 1(f) to provide that "[e]vidence" of a defendant's intent to rely on an alibi defense "is not... admissible"
against the defen169
dant if he later withdraws any notice of this intent.
Second, it is not clear that the Bartholomew Court concludes that polygraph results are immaterial because they are "not 'evidence' at all." Indeed,
after calling the results "not 'evidence,"' the Court does not end its analysis, but
rather inserts another link in the chain of reasoning: "Disclosure of the polygraph results, then, could have had no direct effect on the outcome of trial..
,170 That is, the Court's characterization of the polygraph results as "not 'evidence' at all" may not have been intended to be, in itself, an argument supporting immateriality. Rather, it is one step toward the conclusion of "no direct effect." This argument is addressed immediately below.

b.

"No DirectEffect'"

The Court stated that disclosure of the polygraph results "could have
had no direct effect on the outcome of trial."'171 This implies that a "direct ef165 See supra notes 162-164.
166 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 106, 56 F.R.D. 183, 200 (1972) (as first transmitted to Congress by
Supreme Court) ("[E]vidence" may be admissible for one purpose "but not admissible" for another.), enacted by Congress as Rule 105 in Pub L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1930 (1975) (relevant language not disturbed); Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 410, 56 F.R.D. 183, 228-29 (1972) (as first
transmitted to Congress by Supreme Court) ("Evidence [of certain pleas and withdrawn pleas] is
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer."), enacted by Congress in Pub L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (1975) (relevant language
not disturbed), amended by Congress in Pub. L. No. 94-149, 89 Stat. 805, 805 (1975) (relevant
language no disturbed), amended by Supreme Court in 441 U.S. 970, 1007 (1979) (relevant language not disturbed).
167 327 U.S. 827 (1945) (as first transmitted to Congress by Supreme Court) (attachment to
Letter of Transmittal of Stone, C.J.); 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
168 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a).
169 Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 372, 373 (1975), amended by Supreme Court in 105 F.R.D. 179,
182 (1985) (relevant language not disturbed), amended by Supreme Court in 114 F.R.D. 113, 12324 (1987) (relevant language not disturbed), amended by Supreme Court in 207 F.R.D. 89, 176
(2002) (relevant language not disturbed).
170 Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 6.
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fect" is necessary to prove materiality. 72 Because inadmissible evidence can
have only an indirect effect, the argument concludes, it can never be material.
The rest of the Bartholomew opinion undercuts this argument. Immediately after observing that the polygraph results could not have directly affected
the trial, the Court notes how the Ninth Circuit opinion tried to "get around this
problem" by finding an indirect effect. Namely, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the polygraph results would have caused the defense to suspect Rodney and
depose him accordingly, thereby obtaining evidence of his participation in the
crime.' 73 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's attempt not because indirect
effects are never material, but because this particular indirect effect "is based on
mere speculation."'' 74 That is, indirect effects may be material; this one, however, according to the Court, simply was not.
The State of Washington's petition for certiorari helps explain why the
Court may have used this "direct effect" language. In a footnote, the State argues for an admissibility requirement to deal with the pragmatic concern that
"the court cannot directly gauge the effect the information may have had on the
trial.' 75 Thus, rather than actually creating an admissibility requirement, the
Court appears simply to be acknowledging the State's contention (that no direct
effect exists on the given facts) before beginning an analysis of potential indirect effect.
Furthermore, in that same footnote in its petition for certiorari, the State
argues that operating without an admissibility requirement "inevitably encourages speculation" with respect to the materiality-in-fact of the suppressed evidence at issue. 1 76 Therefore, it is possible that the "no direct effect" argument
analyzed in this section is not an argument in itself, but merely a smaller part of
a larger argument involving the purportedly speculative nature of the materiality-in-fact inquiry with respect to inadmissible evidence. This argument is analyzed directly below.
c.

"Mere Speculation"

The Court held that the Ninth Circuit's explanation of the effect the polygraph results would have had on the trial was "mere speculation.' ' 177 In every
case, the argument goes, there can be only "speculation"--never a "reasonable

172

For an example of a court using this argument, see Penick v. Fillion, 144 F. Supp. 2d 145,

158 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
173
Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 6.
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20 n.7, Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (No. 94-1419) (emphasis
added).
174
175

176

Id.

177

Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 6.
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probability"-that, had inadmissible evidence been disclosed to the78defense, the
defendant would have been acquitted or received a lighter sentence.1
Here, the claim does not involve a reformulation of the legal materiality
standard. Instead, it purports to state a matter of fact. The claim is that inadmissible evidence never in practice rises to the level of material-in-fact.
As the introductory hypothetical demonstrates, this simply is not true.
John's statement casting suspicion on Shelley was inadmissible yet material-infact. 17 9 Moreover, the Court's detailed analysis of the facts and trial strategies in
the actual case belie any suggestion that it held inadmissible evidence to be per
se speculative.' 80 After all, if inadmissible evidence were per se speculative,
such analysis would be unnecessary. Proponents of this argument would have a
stronger case if the Court had demonstrated how evaluating the effect of inadmissible evidence on a trial outcome always involves "mere speculation," but
the Court did not take this route. The analysis was confined to the Ninth Circuit's evaluation of the effect of inadmissible evidence in this particular case.
It is certainly true that proving materiality-in-fact for inadmissible evidence is inherently more difficult than proving it for admissible evidence. This
is because the inquiry for inadmissible evidence requires an extra step. The
overall question in each case is the same: Would disclosure of evidence have let
to acquittal?1 8' But, with inadmissible evidence, that overall question has a latent sub-question: Would disclosure lead to admissible evidence? 82 It is that
admissible evidence which then leads to acquittal.
With admissible evidence, on the other hand, this first step does not require any extra effort. 183 The initial evidence disclosed is (by assumption) admissible. But the Court did not endeavor to prove that the more demanding
showing required for inadmissible evidence is never possible.

For an example of a court using this argument, see Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 604
(8th Cir. 1998).
179 See supra Part I.
180 Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 6-9 (analyzing potential changes to scope of Rodney's crossexamination, as well as weight of other untainted evidence).
181 The guilt phase will be considered for concreteness.
This admissible evidence need not be a tangible document or physical thing. It can be wit182
178

ness testimony produced by questions that the attorney would not have asked had he not learned
of the initial inadmissible evidence. The point is that the jury must at some point have heard
something new, otherwise they will simply convict once again.
183 This is easy to see mathematically. Call the probability that the initial disclosure of evidence will lead to admissible evidence P1 , and call the probability that the admissible evidence
>
leads to acquittal P 2. Call the "reasonable probability" R. Proving materiality requires P, x P2
R. However, when the initial evidence is admissible, P, = 1 automatically. Therefore, all that is
required is P2 > R, a less complicated and less demanding showing.
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Disclosure to the Factfinderor to the Defense?

The Bartholomew opinion recited the prevailing materiality standard as
follows: "[E]vidence is 'material' under Brady, and the failure to disclose it
justifies setting aside a conviction, only where there exists a 'reasonable probability' that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been
different."' 8 4 The Court did not indicate that the relevant disclosure is disclosure
to the defense. Therefore, the argument holds, it must have intended to require
disclosure to the jury, which in turn requires admissibility.'8 5
Even if this argument was true immediately after Bartholomew, the inference falls apart when considering subsequent cases. In each Brady case after
Bartholomew, the Court explained that the relevant disclosure was indeed disclosure to the defense. 186 Moreover, the Bartholomew Court expressly purported
to follow Kyles (though it failed as a textual matter),
which specified that disclo87
sure to the defense was the appropriate baseline.
C.

The Textual Shiftfrom Bagley to Kyles: A Stronger Rejection ofAdmissibility?

The above analysis attempted to demonstrate that the Court's opinions
in its Brady line of cases contemplate that constitutional criminal discovery encompasses inadmissible evidence. But, has the Court given any indications
stronger than the inferences drawn above that admissibility is not required?
An affirmative answer to this question might be suggested by observing
the shift in the Court's wording of the materiality standard from Bagley to Kyles
and beyond. A majority of the Justices in Bagley held that evidence is material
"only if' the requisite reasonable probability exists.1 88 This formulation in terms
of necessity, rather than sufficiency, suggests that materiality might require
more than materiality-in-fact. Yet, the Kyles opinion, though purporting to follow Bagley, omits the "only" in its recitation of the materiality standard and
retains just the "if," giving rise to the inference that materiality-in-fact-without
more-suffices to show materiality.189 That is, factors other than materiality-infact-such as admissibility-do not enter the inquiry.
Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 5.
A LEXIS search did not uncover any court decisions (reported or unreported) invoking this
argument.
186
Youngblood, 126 S. Ct. at 2190 ("[H]ad the evidence been disclosed to the defense ...
Banks, 540 U.S. at 703 ("[H]ad the suppressed infonnation been disclosed to the defense.");
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280 ("[H]ad the evidence been disclosed to the defense . .
187
514 U.S. at 433.
188
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ.); Id. at 685 (Burger, C.J., White &
Rehnquist, JJ.).
184

185

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 ("[Flavorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results
from its suppression by the government, 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
189
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The Bartholomew Court reverts to an "only if' standard, but it purports
to follow Kyles.' 9° All of the Court's post-Bartholomew Brady cases use the "if'
formulation rather than the "only if' formulation.' 91 Therefore, the argument
by
concludes, the Court has affirmatively rejected an admissibility requirement
92
holding that materiality-in-fact is all that is required to prove materiality.1
This argument, though linguistically appealing, seems jurisprudentially
inconclusive. This is in large part because one can never be sure whether postKyles Courts cite Kyles because they think the Kyles opinion faithfully incorporates the Bagley necessity test (as it expressly claims to do) or because they
think it departs from Bagley and uses a sufficiency test (as its actual recitation of
the standard ends up doing). Further, at least one of the Court's postBartholomew decisions appears to equivocate by reciting the Kyles "if' standard
but in a subsequent breath using "only if'-type language, explaining what a
Brady petitioner "must" do. 19 3 Therefore, this necessity-versus-sufficiency analysis seems to be a non-starter. But, this does not undermine the rest of the conclusions drawn in Part II.B.
IV. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF AN ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENT:

COGNIZABILITY AND FEDERAL APPELLATE REVIEW

It appears that the Supreme Court has not established an admissibility
requirement for evidence forming the basis of a Brady claim. Yet, it has not
rejected such a requirement as expressly as it could have. It will be valuable,
then, to evaluate the functional consequences of an admissibility requirement,
using normative and policy considerations as a guide. Some of these consequences are analyzed below.
A.

Brady Claims that Are and Are Not Eliminated

A threshold issue in evaluating the merits of an admissibility requirement is determining whether, in practice, the requirement would change the
current Brady landscape. That is, if material-in-fact evidence is always (or almost always) admissible, the admissibility requirement would not serve to disallow any (or at least many) Brady claims that are currently allowed. The added
hurdle would have no real gatekeeper effect. As the introductory hypothetical
shows, however, this is not the case.
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' (emphasis
added) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 668)).
190 Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 5 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 419).
191 Youngblood, 126 S.Ct. at 2190; Banks, 540 U.S. at 703; Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280.
192 A LEXIS search did not uncover any court decisions (reported or unreported) invoking this
argument.
193 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289 (petitioner "must convince [a court]" that evidence meets the
"reasonable probability" standard).
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A Compelling Claim Prevented

Re-examining the introductory hypothetical lets one construct the
strongest case against an admissibility requirement. 94 First, the prosecution
must have suppressed inadmissible evidence that is material-in-fact because
there is a reasonable probability that, had the inadmissible evidence been disclosed to the defense, the defense would have used it to discover admissible
evidence to put before the factfinder and procure an acquittal. 195 In the introductory hypothetical, John's statement is the predicate inadmissible evidence,
and Shelley's burglary tools are the ultimate admissible evidence.
Second, the defense will have done the investigative legwork and uncovered the admissible evidence-rather than simply asserting a strong probability that it will uncover the admissible evidence. This happened in the introductory hypothetical when the defense discovered the burglary tools in Shelley's desk.
Third, the defense will have proved that it would have taken those same
investigative steps and discovered the same material-in-fact admissible evidence
had the disclosure happened before trial. Suppose (as seems likely), for the purposes of this discussion, that George's counsel could have proved that John's
statement would have led him to the burglary tools.
One further condition is needed to make the claim maximally sympathetic. Suppose that John made a different statement. Suppose he wrote: "I had
a motivational speaker come into the office today." This statement comes to
light, and George is able to prove (somehow) that this statement would have
caused him to recall a time during the speaker's talk when Shelley was blinking
his eyes in a strange cadence, which in turn would have suggested that maybe
Shelley has something to hide, which in turn would have caused George to
search Shelley's desk, which would have produced the burglary tools.
This new statement is material-in-fact. It passes the "reasonable probability" test, because (by hypothesis) the numerical probability that disclosure to
the defense would lead to an acquittal is high enough. The adjective "reasonable" does not require that a "reasonable person" would have made the same
logical leaps that George made.' 96 The Brady obligation measures materiality
from the point of "disclos[ure] to the defense," rather than "to a reasonable de-

See supra Part I.
This "discovery" is not limited to physical evidence. The new evidence can take the form of
testimony, given in response to new questions, that was not elicited during trial. The point is that
some type of new evidence must be shown to the jury at some point; otherwise the jury would
(presumably) vote once again to convict.
196
In contrast, the materiality standard used in the federal securities laws embraces the reasonable-person requirement. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote.") (emphasis added).
194

195
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fense team" or the equivalent.' 97 The adjective "reasonable" relates only to the
numerical probability of acquittal.' 98
It is likely that, in practice, a court would refuse to believe that George
would have made those logical leaps and therefore would hold that materialityin-fact had not been established. But, strictly speaking, without an admissibility
requirement, such a statement would give rise to a Brady claim. One might
think that such a claim is not very sympathetic due to the far-flung objectively
unreasonable inferences the petitioner must assert he would make. Therefore, a
maximally sympathetic Brady claim requires that a reasonable person must have
been able to use the inadmissible evidence to discover the admissible evidence. 99
As indicated by the introductory hypothetical, Brady claims satisfying
all of these conditions do exist. An admissibility requirement would make them
noncognizable.
2.

An Unreasonable Claim Prevented-But Is There a Better
Way?

The "motivational speaker" revision of the introductory hypothetical
presents a Brady claim that is objectively unreasonable but that is nevertheless
cognizable if materiality-in-fact is the sole inquiry of the materiality prong. An
admissibility requirement would block such a claim. Suppose one agrees that
this is the right outcome. Nevertheless, the benefits of using an admissibility
requirement to eliminate these unreasonable, unsympathetic claims may not
exceed the cost generated when such a requirement eliminates compelling
claims like the original introductory hypothetical.
Is there a finer mechanism that preserves the compelling claims yet still
blocks the unreasonable ones? The answer is quite clearly "Yes." This filtration can be accomplished by applying a judicial gloss to Brady requiring a rea197 See, e.g., Youngblood, 126 S. Ct. at 2190 (emphasis added).
198 This is made clear by Justice Souter's recommendation to use the phrase "significant possibility" instead of "reasonable probability" in the Brady test. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 298-301
(Souter, J., concurring).
199 It is worth noting that the Court's holding that evidence is material if it "could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the outcome of
the trial," Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, does not necessarily eliminate the materiality of the "motivational speaker" hypothetical by injecting the sort of reasonable-person requirement that would
make this claim fatal. This is because the wording of the test is perfectly consistent with the following interpretation of it: Courts are to ask whether a reasonable factfinder would view the case
in a different light taking the petitioner'ssubjective inferences as given.
Of course, the language in Kyles is also consistent with a traditional reasonable-person
requirement. But, if such a reasonable-person requirement is already built into the Brady test,
then the reasons for adopting an admissibility requirement are less compelling still. To the extent
it serves to impose a reasonable-person requirement, an admissibility requirement would be redundant.
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sonable person in the defendant's position to have been able to uncover the admissible evidence. It is certainly true that a "reasonable person" standard will
be harder to administer than the (comparatively bright-line) standard of admissibility. But, courts routinely administer the "reasonable person" standard in a
wide variety of contexts. There is no reason to believe that a "reasonable person" requirement would be less workable here. 2 °
3.

A Malicious Prosecutorial Strategy Facilitated

Recall again the introductory hypothetical. 2 ° ' John's eyewitness statement is inadmissible hearsay.2 °2 George's Brady claim predicated on this statement is therefore blocked.20 3
John's death was not suspicious. But suppose that John was not hit by a
bus. Suppose instead that a conniving member of the prosecution team arranged
for John to be awarded a free trip to a foreign country where he could not be
compelled by process to testify in an American court. Suppose further that the
trip just happened to coincide with the time of trial. In a regime with an admissibility requirement, George's Brady claim will be blocked once again. 2°
Though this observation is not intended to suggest a negative view of
prosecutors as a group, the fact remains that Brady violations are inherently hard
to police precisely because prosecutors have so much control over what items in
their case file see the light of day. 20 5 Therefore, the concern that a prosecutor
20 6
might actually employ the devious strategy identified here is not unfounded.

200

Alternatively, a court could eschew reasonable-person analysis and use inadmissibility to

establish a presumption of immateriality rebuttable by the petitioner's proof of materiality-in-fact.
201 See supra Part I.
202
See supra note 12.
203
See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
204
Watkins, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 845 ("[If admissibility were required, p]rosecutors could conceal
the existence of known eyewitnesses.... Unless such a witness testifies at trial... the verbatim
statement or affidavit would be inadmissible hearsay.").
205
See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, ProsecutorialEthics Symposium: Reflections on Brady v.
Maryland, 47 S. TEx. L. REv. 685, 687-88 (2006) ("[The Brady obligation is] virtually unenforceable when violations are hidden. Because Brady applies to evidence known only to the prosecutor
and unknown to the defense, disclosure of this evidence depends almost exclusively on the diligence, integrity, and good faith of the prosecutor."); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 962 n.22 (1989) ("Brady violations are
hard to detect. Unless the defendant somehow fortuitously learns of the exculpatory information
and the prosecution's possession of it, a Brady violation will never come to light.").
206 Indeed, such a suggestion was recently entertained by a federal district court. Watkins, 92 F.
Supp. 2d at 844-46.
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Effect on U.S. Supreme Court Review and Habeas Review

An admissibility requirement not only eliminates Brady claims with
compelling factual predicates and facilitates underhanded prosecutorial behavior, but it may eliminate two avenues of federal appellate review of the suppression, favorability, and materiality-in-fact elements. The law on these elements
is unsettled, and its development would suffer to the extent it is insulated from
federal review.
The first avenue of review narrowed by an admissibility requirement is
U.S. Supreme Court review of Brady claims coming from state high courts on
direct review. Realizing why this is so requires a brief examination of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction and certiorari practices with respect to state
high-court decisions. The scope of the Court's appellate review of state highcourt decisions is usually confined to questions of federal law. 20 7 That is, state
high-court judgments on issues of state law are almost always the last word on
those issues.20 8 Also, the Court will not grant certiorari on a case where its ruling would be strictly advisory, in the sense that it would not be sufficient to reverse the judgment of the court below. 2°9
Now, suppose that a Brady claim comes to a state's highest court. That
court can rule for the prisoner or for the State. In a regime with an admissibility
requirement, ruling for the prisoner requires finding that evidence was (1) suppressed, (2) favorable, (3) material-in-fact, and (4) admissible. The absence of
any of these elements results in a ruling for the State.
Suppose the state high court finds a Brady violation, and the State petitions for certiorari. The Supreme Court must accept the state high court's judgment of admissibility because it is a matter of state evidence law.210 But, the
Court can reject the state high court's judgment on the federal issues (suppression, favorability, and materiality-in-fact), because these are matters of federal
constitutional law. 21' Because rejecting the state court's determination on any
federal element would turn the victory for the prisoner into a victory for the
State, the Court may well grant certiorari.
Alternatively, suppose that the state high court finds no Brady violation.
If the state high court found that the evidence was admissible but found that
fewer than all of the federal elements were satisfied, the Supreme Court may
grant certiorari and re-examine each of the federal elements. This is because the
State's victory, in such a situation, stands or falls on federal issues. But, if the
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 630 (1875) (concluding that the Supreme Court
will ordinarily not review "questions not of a federal character" present in state high-court case).
207
208

Id.

209

Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) ("We are not permitted to render an advisory

opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its
views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.").
210
Murdock, 87 U.S. at 630.
211

Id.
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state court found the evidence inadmissible (or did not reach admissibility), certiorari would be inappropriate because even a total reversal on the federal issues
originally decided in the State's favor would not reverse the judgment. 2 12 In the
absence of an admissibility requirement, this obstacle would not exist; all judgments finding no Brady violation would be reviewable on certiorari.
The same considerations apply to federal district court habeas review of
state proceedings. This is because habeas courts only consider issues of federal
law and generally employ the same type of reviewability protocols as the Supreme Court.213 The following table summarizes the scenarios described above.

212

It is true that the adequate-and-independent-state-ground doctrine is not implicated here.

Rather than being independent to the decision of materiality, the state-law ruling on admissibility
is antecedent to it. It is also true that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review statecourt judgments on federal rights involving antecedent state-law issues. RICHARD H. FALLON ET
AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 493 (5th ed. 2003).
But, the purpose of that review is, arguably, confined to the protection of the subsequent federal
right against malicious manipulation by state courts. See Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust
Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944). It is not assumed for the purposes of this Article that there is any
reason to suspect state courts of this practice.
Moreover, such review has almost always occurred when the antecedent issue involves a
state-created right (such as property), rather than a state-law issue not touching on any sort of
entitlement. FALLON ET AL. at 528-36. Indeed, Herbert Wechsler stated that Supreme Court review of state-court judgments on state law is necessary when that state law is "logically antecedent" to the application of federal law. If a federal law protects property rights, for example,
determining the meaning of "property" under state law is logically antecedent to examining
whether the federal law has been violated. Herbert Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1043, 1054, 1052 (1977) (identifying only antecedent state-law rights and entitlements as permitting Supreme Court review). But, because inadmissible evidence may be material-in-fact as an
empirical matter, it is not the case that a state-law admissibility determination is logically antecedent to the application of the federal materiality-in-fact standard. It is artificially made antecedent
by a court choosing to graft such a requirement onto its Brady analysis.
Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that Supreme Court review of a statecourt judgment on state law is "unusual" as a general matter, even if the state-law issue is antecedent to a federal-law issue See Ernest A. Young, InstitutionalSettlement in a Globalizing Judicial
System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1193 n.210 (2005) (explaining that Supreme Court review of an antecedent state-law issue is "unusual" for the same reasons that Supreme Court review of an adequate
and independent state-law issue would be).
213
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (adequate-and-independent-stateground doctrine applies to habeas review as well as Supreme Court certiorari determinations);
RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LtEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
26.1 (2006) (policies behind Supreme Court certiorari practices also underlie habeas review).
Of course, a habeas court does not "review" a state judgment in the same way that the Supreme Court does. "Review" here simply means examining state trial and post-trial proceedings.
In the habeas context, the relevant ruling on admissibility would likely come during the course of
state post-trial proceedings.
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Review of Brady Cases in an Admissibility Regime
Given the State High Court's Grounds for Judgment
Did the State High Court Hold
thatAll of the FederalElements Were Satisfied?
Yes

Did Not Reach

Supreme Court /
habeas court
can review

N/A

Supreme Court /
habeas court
can review

N/A

N/A

Supreme Court /
habeas court
review improper

Supreme Court /
habeas court
review improper

Supreme Court /
habeas court
review improper

Supreme Court /
habeas court
review improper

This narrowing of review is entirely one-sided in favor of the State.
Judgments finding a Brady violation (against the State) are always reviewable,
but judgments finding no violation (in favor of the State) are reviewable only
when the state court finds the evidence admissible. To the extent that a more
robust Brady jurisprudence is desirable, an admissibility requirement is undesirable because it significantly impedes federal-court development of the suppression, favorability, and materiality-in-fact elements.
V. THE FEASIBILITY, COSTS, AND BENEFITS OF CASE-BY-CASE MATERIALITYIN-FACT DETERMINATION

It is of course true that an admissibility requirement would eliminate a
great deal of case-by-case materiality-in-fact analysis and therefore dispose of a
chunk of Brady claims that would otherwise involve factually complex litigation
over whether a defendant would have used inadmissible evidence to discover
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admissible evidence. A proponent of an admissibility requirement might argue
that this artificial streamlining is necessary because courts cannot possibly develop a principled body of law to aide their judgments in this realm.
This argument can be answered briefly, however, by pointing to the
doctrine of inevitable discovery. In cases implicating that doctrine, courts routinely make counterfactual judgments about the discovery of evidence.2 14 There,
the question is whether, given a piece of illegally discovered evidence, the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence by legal means (thus allowing it to be used substantively against a defendant at trial).21 5 In the Brady context, the relevant analogous question is whether, given a proffered (in the maximally sympathetic case) or hypothesized (in an ordinary case) piece of admissible evidence, the defense team would have discovered it by following leads
generated by a piece of inadmissible evidence. The inquiries are nearly functionally identical; each demands that a court evaluate a person's ability to follow
leads generated by one piece of evidence in order to eventually discover another
piece of evidence. It is hard to imagine that courts called upon to resolve this
question in the inevitable discovery context would be unable to do so in the
Brady context.
The proponent might concede that courts have this ability but nevertheless insist that an admissibility requirement is desirable as a cost-saving mechanism because it would eliminate the need for the sort of complex factual determinations explained immediately above. Importantly, the proponent would add
that an admissibility requirement would achieve the same end result (in terms of
accuracy) as case-by-case litigation in nearly all cases. It would make litigation
less costly but not less accurate. While it is impossible to refute this empirical
argument without empirical evidence, it is nevertheless possible to weaken it.
First, this argument ignores the possibility that the very existence of the
requirement will cause prosecutors to conceal evidence with greater frequency
than before (because with the requirement, but not without it, this strategy
would block a Brady claim under certain circumstances). 1 6 Therefore, it is not
clear that accuracy would indeed be maintained. Second, and more significant,
this argument implicitly assumes that the benefits of allowing a compelling
Brady claim of the sort described by the introductory hypothetical do not out217
weigh the cost savings of a per se rule (whatever they may be).
It is not at all
obvious that this is true, in part because the introductory hypothetical was constructed to be capable of repetition and not to be unique and fanciful. 21 8 The
214

See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (holding that evidence illegally obtained not

excluded if prosecution can demonstrate that it would have discovered that evidence via legal
means).
215

Id.

216

See supra Part IV.A.3.

217

See supra Parts I, IV.A. 1.

218

Id.
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benefits of not imposing an admissibility requirement may recur more frequently than the costs, and it seems premature to argue that the aggregate of all
such costs exceeds the aggregate of all such benefits.2 19
VI. THE CHARACTER OF AN ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL OR PRUDENTIAL?
Suppose the Court does decide to recognize an admissibility requirement. Is this requirement compelled by the Constitution, as the classical components-suppression, favorability, and materiality-in-fact-are? 220 Or, is it prudential?
The distinction between the constitutional and prudential aspects of a
given doctrine is a familiar one in the law of standing in civil cases. In this domain, the Court has identified several constitutional requirements a litigant must
meet in order to have his case heard and has distinguished these mandatory minima from conditions Congress can legislatively override. 22 1 The constitutional/prudential divide has received far less attention in other realms.
If there is an admissibility requirement, it likely is constitutional rather
than prudential. While the Supreme Court's analysis of admissibility has been
less than transparent, 222 it has always fallen under the materiality umbrella. For
example, the Bartholomew Court uses the lack of admissibility of polygraph
evidence as a stepping stone to a finding of immateriality.22 3 Circuit and district
courts confronting the issue place the admissibility requirement under the materiality heading with near-unanimity.2 24
The Brady Court made very clear that materiality is a constitutional requirement.22 5 Therefore, if admissibility is part of materiality, any admissibility
requirement must also be constitutionally compelled. The constitutional nature
of such a requirement means that Congress cannot override the requirement in
particular cases. A constitutional amendment, and only a constitutional amendment, can accomplish this task.

219

Simply put, it may be premature to endorse any such empirical, cost-benefit argument with-

out careful study of that specific issue. An economic analysis of a purported admissibility requirement would be necessary to help evaluate such a claim.
220
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.") (emphasis added).
221 See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (distinguishing constitutionally
compelled standing requirements from judicially created prudential requirements).
222
See supra Part III.
223 Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 5-6, 8-9.
224
See supra note 13.
225

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

33

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 110

On the other hand, if the admissibility requirement were prudential,
Congress could carve out exceptions.2 26 For example, Congress could legislatively introduce a reasonable-person standard. It could eliminate the admissibility requirement in all cases where the inadmissible evidence would have led a
reasonable person in the defendant's position to discover the material-in-fact
admissible evidence. This would preserve compelling claims (like the introductory hypothetical) and eliminate objectively unreasonable ones (like the revised
"motivational speaker" hypothetical).
Characterizing the admissibility requirement as prudential also gives
Congress the flexibility to develop exceptions as the courts gain experience with
the doctrine. For example, Congress may over time observe that inadmissible
material-in-fact evidence shows up repeatedly in one subject-matter category of
cases. It can then use this experience to statutorily override a prudential admissibility requirement in this category if it wishes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Though many lower courts have held otherwise, it appears that the Supreme Court has contemplated that inadmissible evidence may form the predicate for a Brady claim. But, the Court has not affirmatively rejected an admissibility requirement as clearly as it could have. Therefore, a normative judgment must be made: What role should admissibility play in the context of
Brady discovery?
Requiring admissibility eliminates certain claims through no fault of the
prisoner's own. For example, returning to the introductory hypothetical, the
only reason George's Brady claim was denied was because John happened to be
the victim of a fatal bus accident. 227 As a corollary, prosecutorial abuse is facilitated, since the government could affirmatively "hide" a witness in order to turn
a statement admissible for its truth into inadmissible hearsay. 22' And though
Brady claims involving the use of objectively unreasonable inferences to discover admissible evidence via leads generated by inadmissible evidence would
be eliminated by an admissibility requirement, they could also be dealt with just
as effectively by means which do not disallow the compelling, sympathetic
claim identified above. In particular, they could be curtailed by requiring that a
reasonable person in the defendant's position could have made those same inferences.22 9

226

See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394 n.7 (1987) (prudential limitations

susceptible to legislative override).
227
See supra Parts I, IV.A. 1.
228
See supra Part IV.A.3.
229

See supra Part IV.A.2. This problem could also be solved by using lack of admissibility as a

presumption of immateriality, which could be rebutted by a showing of materiality-in-fact. See
supra note 200.
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Additionally, requiring admissibility cuts off two major sources of federal review of the suppression, favorability, and materiality-in-fact elements:
Supreme Court direct review from a state high court (important for its precedential value) and habeas review by a district court (important because of the frequency with which such forum is the venue for Brady claims). This occurs when
the underlying criminal trial takes place in state court and therefore makes admissibility an issue of state evidence law. The presence of a state-law issue
works in conjunction with the Supreme Court's certiorari practices (and, hence,
with federal district courts' habeas review strictures) to deny the opportunity for
further review when the state court's determination of that state-law issue is
dispositive. 230
Further, economic arguments for the superiority of an admissibility requirement over case-by-case materiality-in-fact determination are premature and
possibly incorrect.2 31
It seems desirable, then, not to make materiality determinations turn on
the labels "admissible" and "inadmissible." Admittedly, these labels are not
irrelevant. For example, as noted earlier, it may be very hard to convince a court
that the defense team actually would have pursued certain leads generated by a
piece of inadmissible evidence in certain ways to arrive at some piece of admissible material-in-fact evidence.232 The defense surely has a greater likelihood of
prevailing if it needs to prove only how the ultimate admissible evidence would
change the factfinder's view and can avoid the additional hurdle of proving how
it would have discovered the admissible evidence in the first place.
But, it is the operation of principles behind these labels that actually
animates the Brady analysis. The relevance of the inadmissible evidence and the
attenuation of the investigative leads it generates are what the purported admissibility requirement seeks to evaluate. However, this per se categorical approach
goes overboard. Courts are perfectly competent in making counterfactual judgments regarding discovery of evidence and do so frequently, for example in
cases involving the doctrine of inevitable discovery. 234 There does not appear to
be any compelling reason why case-by-case analysis, coupled with a reasonableperson requirement of the type explained above, cannot-and there are several
good reasons identified earlier why it can and should-serve this function.

230

See supra Part IV.B.

231

See supra Part V.
See Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 6-7 (providing a discussion of proving indirect effect).
For a mathematical explanation of why this showing is theoretically more difficult, see

232
233

supra note 183.
234
See supra Part V.
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